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Abstract
This thesis aims to show that in some applications the ap-
propriate selection of a small number of available items can be
beneficial with respect to the use of all available items.
In particular, we focus on portfolio selection and on operational
risk management and we use operations research techniques to
identify the few important elements that are needed in both cases.
In the first part of this work - based on an article published in
Economics Bulletin [Cesarone et al (2016)], we show that, for sev-
eral portfolio selection models, the best portfolio which uses only
a limited number of assets has in-sample performance very close
to that of an optimized portfolio which could include all assets,
but generally obtains better out-of-sample performance. This is
true for various performance measures, and it is often possible to
identify a "golden range" of sizes where the best performances
are obtained. These general empirical findings are consistent with
theoretical results obtained by Kondor and Nagy (2007) under
very restrictive assumptions. We also note that small portfolios
are preferable for several practical reasons including monitoring,
availability for small investors, and transaction costs.
In the second part of the thesis, we develop an operational risk
management framework for the assessment of the exposure of a
company (with particular reference to a financial institution) to
potential risk events arising from the launch of a new product.
This framework is based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process and
on the 80/20 rule which allows one to rank and to identify the
most relevant risk events, respectively.
By means of appropriate integer programming models we then
address the problem of identifying the mitigation actions that se-
cure the internal processes of a company with minimum cost. This
corresponds to the primary goal of an operational risk manager:
reducing the exposure to potential risk events. An alternative ap-
proach, when the budget is fixed, consists in selecting the subset
of mitigation actions that provide the greatest reduction in oper-
ational risk exposure for that budget. A parametric analysis with
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respect to the budget level provides additional information for the
management to take decisions about possible budget adjustments.
Keywords: Asset Management; Risk Diversification; Size Con-
straints; Small Portfolios; Analytic Hierarchy Process; New prod-
uct; Operational Risk Assessment; 80/20 rule.
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Chapter 1
Optimally chosen small portfolios
are better than large ones
One of the fundamental principles in portfolio selection models
is minimization of risk through diversification of the investment.
However, this principle does not necessarily translate into a re-
quest for investing in all the assets of the investment universe.
Indeed, following a line of research started by Evans and Archer
almost fifty years ago, we provide here further evidence that small
portfolios are sufficient to achieve almost optimal in-sample risk
reduction with respect to variance and to some other popular risk
measures, and very good out-of-sample performances.
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While leading to similar results, our approach is significantly
different from the classical one pioneered by Evans and Archer. In-
deed, we describe models for choosing the portfolio of a prescribed
size with the smallest possible risk, as opposed to the random port-
folio choice investigated in most of the previous works. We find
that the smallest risk portfolios generally require no more than 15
assets. Furthermore, it is almost always possible to find portfolios
that are just 1% more risky than the smallest risk portfolios and
contain no more than 10 assets. Furthermore, the optimal small
portfolios generally show a better performance than the optimal
large ones.
Our empirical analysis is based on some new and on some pub-
licly available benchmark data sets often used in the literature.
1.1 Introduction
Since the start of Modern Portfolio Theory with the seminal Mean-
Variance (MV) model of Markowitz (1952, 1959), the main aim of
portfolio selection models was that of reducing the risk of an in-
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vestment in the stock market through diversification while trying
to achieve a satisfactory return. However, Markowitz also realized
that, due to high correlations in the stock market, the benefit of
diversification would rapidly decline with the size of the portfolio.
In his fundamental book Markowitz (1959) he observed that: “To
understand the general properties of large portfolios we must con-
sider the averaging together of large numbers of highly correlated
outcomes. We find that diversification is much less powerful in
this case. Only a limited reduction in variability can be achieved
by increasing the number of securities in a portfolio.”
The first empirical evidence of the sufficiency of small portfo-
lios to achieve almost complete elimination of the diversifiable risk
in a market is probably due to a very influential work by Evans
and Archer (1968) where, for any given size K from 1 to 40, they
randomly picked subsets of K assets from a market of 470 secu-
rities and computed some statistics on the standard deviations of
the Equally-Weighted portfolios formed with each subset of assets.
They found that the average standard deviation for each size K
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was decreasing and rapidly converging to an asymptote and they
concluded that no more than around 10 assets were needed to
almost completely eliminate the unsystematic variation of a port-
folio return.
Thenceforth, several authors contributed to the debate about
the right size of a portfolio that almost completely eliminates
the diversifiable risk in a market (see, e.g., Newbould and Poon
(1993) and references therein). Furthermore, based on Evans
and Archer’s and on other similar findings, such magic size, or
size range, has been recommended in several textbooks on invest-
ment management and on corporate finance, as reported by Tang
(2004).
There are several reasons for preferring small portfolios to large
portfolios. The first and more obvious one concerns the infeasibil-
ity of holding large portfolios for small investors. However, even
big investors should consider the opportunity cost of holding large
portfolios and should identify the threshold where the costs exceed
the benefit of risk reduction. Statman (1987) identifies such costs
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with the transaction costs and, using the cost of holding an in-
dex fund that replicates the market as a proxy, finds a threshold
around 30-40 assets. Furthermore, there are other sources of cost
that depend on the size such as those for monitoring the behavior
and fundamentals of all the companies involved in the portfolio.
Another important advantage of small portfolios seems to be that
of reducing the estimation errors for variances and covariances
thus leading to better out of sample performance (see, e.g., Ce-
sarone et al (2014); DeMiguel et al (2009a)).
In this work we provide further evidence of the benefits of
small portfolios both in terms of in-sample risk reduction and
in terms of out-of-sample performance. However, our approach is
significantly different from the mainstream approach pioneered by
Evans and Archer. Indeed, we overcome one of the main weak-
nesses of their approach which consists in stating results that are
valid only on average. In other words, if one picks an arbitrary
Equally-Weighted portfolio of a given size in a market, there is no
guarantee that its risk will not be much larger than the average
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risk of all portfolios of the same size in that market.
The conceptually simple solution that we propose here is just
to choose the best Equally-Weighted portfolio for each given size
with respect to variance, and, furthermore, the optimal portfolios
for each given size with respect to three different and complemen-
tary risk measures. In this way for each size we clearly obtain a
portfolio which has a risk not greater (and typically quite smaller)
than the average risk. The reason why this simple idea was not
investigated before is probably due to the computational hardness
of the models required to find such best portfolios. Indeed, some
of these models have been solved exactly only recently for small
to medium size markets (see, e.g., Angelelli et al (2008); Cesarone
et al (2015) and references therein), and one model is solved here
for the first time. Once we have obtained the optimal size of
the minimum risk portfolio, we proceed with a sensitivity analysis
that allows us to find the smallest size of a portfolio whose risk is
not more than 1% larger than that of the minimum risk portfolio,
thus finding even smaller portfolios with satisfactory risk level.
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Another difference between our approach and the one of Evans
and Archer consists in the possibility of using general weights
in the selected portfolio instead of equal weights only. For each
portfolio size, this clearly allows one to find portfolio with even
lower in-sample risk. However, since optimizing weights might
also cause the maximization of estimation errors DeMiguel et al
(2009b); Michaud (1989), this choice does not necessarily implies
better out-of-sample performance. For both weighting schemes
and for all risk measures we find results comparable to those of
Evans and Archer. More precisely, we identify some ranges of
(typically small) sizes where the portfolio risks are minimized and
ranges of even smaller sizes where the portfolio risks do not exceed
the minimum by more than 1%. The out-of-sample performance of
the selected portfolios for each specified size is another important
feature of our analysis which is rarely found in previous works on
the subject. Also in this case we find that the best performances
are generally obtained by portfolios with no more than 15 assets.
As an interesting complement to our findings, we mention that,
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in a recent and detailed analysis on the empirical behavior of in-
vestors and on the performance of their portfolios, Ivković et al
(2008) show that portfolios of small investors with low diversifi-
cation exhibit superior performance with respect to the ones with
high diversification.
1.2 The portfolio models
In this section we describe the models analyzed and we provide an
integer or a mixed-integer linear or quadratic formulation for all
models. We first need to introduce some notation. Let T + 1 be
the length of the in-sample period used to estimate the inputs for
the models. We use pit to denote the price of the i-th asset at time
t, with t = 0, ..., T ; rit =
pit − pi(t−1)
pi(t−1)
is the i-th asset return at
time t, with t = 1, ..., T ; x is the vector whose components xi are
the fractions of a given capital invested in asset i in the portfolio
we are selecting; y is a boolean vector whose components yi are
equal to 1 if asset i is selected, and 0 otherwise. We assume that
n assets are available in a market and, adopting linear returns,
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we have that Rt(x) =
n∑
i=1
xirit is the portfolio return at time t,
with t = 1, ..., T . The n-dimensional vector µ is used to denote
the expected returns of the n risky asset, while Σ denotes their
covariance matrix, and u denotes an n-dimensional vector of ones.
1.2.1 The Equally-Weighted portfolio
The most intuitive way to diversify a portfolio is to equally dis-
tribute the capital among all stocks available in the market. In
terms of relative weights we have xi = 1/n. This is known as the
Equally-Weighted (also called naïve or uniform) portfolio. Clearly
the choice of the Equally-Weighted (EW) portfolio does not use
any in-sample information nor involve any optimization approach.
However, some authors claim that its practical out-of-sample per-
formance is hard to beat on real-world data sets DeMiguel et al
(2009b). Furthermore, from the theoretical viewpoint, Pflug et al
(2012) show that when increasing the amount of portfolio model
uncertainty, i.e., the degree of ambiguity on the distribution of the
assets returns, the optimal portfolio converges to the EW portfo-
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lio. We will thus use this portfolio as a benchmark to compare
the performances of the portfolios obtained by the models.
1.2.2 Fixed-Size Minimum Variance Equally-Weighted
portfolios
As already observed, the EW portfolio is the most robust choice
when there is a great uncertainty about the distribution of the
asset returns. However, the EW portfolio has the drawback of
using all available assets, which might be too numerous and not
all desirable. A first proposal to overcome this drawback is due
to Jacob (1974), who proposes to select a small EW portfolio
(with a specified number K of assets) that has minimum variance
among all EW portfolios of the same size. The model by Jacob is
a nonlinear 0-1 optimization model that has not yet been tested
in practice due to its computational complexity. Thanks to the
recent advances in solution methods and computing power, we
can propose here an empirical study of such Fixed-Size Minimum
Variance Equally-Weighted (FSMVEW) model formally described
10
below.
min yTΣy
s.t. uT y = K
y ∈ {0, 1}n
(1.1)
This is probably the simplest Fixed-Size portfolio model and has
the advantage of not requiring the problematic estimates of the
assets expected returns. Furthermore, the effects of the possible
estimation errors of the covariance matrix Σ do not result in very
large or small weights for some assets, but only influence the choice
of the subset of selected assets in the portfolio. From the optimiza-
tion viewpoint, it falls into the class of pseudoBoolean Quadratic
Programming problems which are known to be theoretically hard
to solve in the worst case (NP-hard) Boros and Hammer (2002).
However, due to its special structure, practical problems of this
type with several hundreds variables can be actually solved fairly
efficiently with available free or commercial codes.
Note that the vector x of weights of the optimal FSMVEW
portfolio selected by model (1.1) is obtained as x = 1Ky. When
K = n the FSMVEW portfolio coincides with the EW portfolio.
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1.2.3 Fixed-Size Minimum Variance portfolios
Another model that does not require the estimates of the assets ex-
pected returns is the extreme case of the Markowitz model where
we only seek to minimize variance. Within our framework we
thus consider the following Fixed-Size Minimum Variance (FSMV)
model where only K assets are allowed in the selected portfolio
min xTΣx
s.t. uTx = 1
uT y = K
`y ≤ x ≤ y,
y ∈ {0, 1}n
(1.2)
The first constraint above is the budget constraint; the second one
represents the portfolio fixed-size constraint; u is an n-dimensional
vector of ones; y is an n-dimensional vector of binary variables
used to select the assets to be included in the portfolio; x is the
vector of portfolio weights, and ` is a minimum threshold (often
called buy-in threshold) for the weights of the selected assets which
must be greater than zero (in our experiments we chose ` = 0.01).
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Without these thresholds, Problem (1.2) could generate portfolios
with less than K assets, which is equivalent to replacing the con-
straint uTy = K with uTy ≤ K. Note that Problem (1.2) is
a Quadratic Mixed Integer Programming (QMIP) problem that
falls again in the class of NP-hard problems. However, also in this
case problems with a few hundred variables can be solved fairly
efficiently with available free or commercial codes. Furthermore,
a recently proposed Cesarone et al (2009, 2013) specialized algo-
rithm can solve problems of this type with up to two thousand
variables.
1.2.4 Fixed-Size Minimum CVaR portfolios
The Fixed-Size Minimum CVaR (FSMCVaR) model is a minimum
risk model like the previous one, but instead of variance it mea-
sures risk with Conditional Value-at-Risk at a specified confidence
level ε (CV aRε), namely the average of losses in the worst 100ε%
of the cases Acerbi and Tasche (2002). In our analysis losses are
defined as negative outcomes, and we set ε equal to 0.05. The
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FSMCVaR model can be written as follows:
min CV aRε(x)
s.t. uTx = 1
uT y = K
`y ≤ x ≤ y,
y ∈ {0, 1}n
(1.3)
where ` plays the same role as in (1.2).
Using a classical approach introduced by Rockafellar and Urya-
sev (2000) (see also Cesarone et al (2014)), Problem (1.3) can
be reformulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP)
problem with n + T + 1 continuous variables, n binary variables
and T + n + 3 constraints. Some recent computational experi-
ences reported in Cesarone et al (2015) on the solution of this
model with state-of-the-art commercial solvers show that models
with more than a few hundreds variables are hard to solve with
general purpose solvers and would probably benefit from more
specialized methods.
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1.2.5 Fixed-Size Minimum Semi-MAD portfolios
The last risk measure that we take into account in our analysis is
the downside Mean Semi-Absolute Deviation (Semi-MAD):
SMAD(x) = E[min(0,
n∑
i=1
(rit − µi)xi)], (1.4)
This is a concise version of the more famous Mean Absolute Devi-
ation (MAD) risk measure, which is defined as the expected value
of the absolute deviation of the portfolio return from its mean
Konno and Yamazaki (1991). Indeed, Speranza (1993) showed
that Semi-MAD leads to a portfolio selection model that is equiv-
alent to the MAD model, but with half the number of constraints.
We thus consider the following Fixed-Size Minimum Semi-MAD
(FSMSMAD) model
min SMAD(x)
s.t. uTx = 1
uT y = K
`y ≤ x ≤ y,
y ∈ {0, 1}n
(1.5)
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where ` plays the same role as in (1.2). Using the linearization
approach described in Speranza (1993), we can reformulate this
problem as a MILP problem with n+T continuous variables, n bi-
nary variables and n+T+3 constraints (see Cesarone et al (2014)).
From the computational experiences reported in Cesarone et al
(2015) it appears that also this model, although slightly easier
than the previous one, cannot easily be solved with general pur-
pose state-of-the-art solvers when more than a few hundreds vari-
ables are involved.
1.3 Empirical behavior of the models
In this section we test the models described above on some publicly
available data sets.
The analysis consists of two parts. First, we examine the be-
havior of the portfolios selected by the models on the in-sample
window where we obtain the input parameters of the models. The
second part consists in evaluating the out-of-sample performance
of the portfolios, which is the aspect that matters most to in-
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vestors.
Since the markets are in continuous evolution, it seems ap-
propriate to rebalance the portfolio from time to time in order
to take new information into account. For this purpose, we use
a Rolling Time Window procedure (RTW), i.e., we shift the in-
sample window (and consequently the out-of-sample window) all
over the time length of each data set. More specifically, we con-
sider a time window (in-sample period) of 200 observations for the
data sets with weekly frequency, and of 120 observations for the
data sets with monthly frequency. The choice of the lengths of the
in-sample and of the out-of-sample windows is based on typical
settings of portfolio selection problems (see, e.g.,Bruni et al (2012,
2013); Cesarone et al (2015); DeMiguel et al (2009a)). Then we
solve the selection problem for overlapping windows built by mov-
ing forward in time with step size 4 (for the weekly data sets) or 1
(for the monthly data sets). The optimal portfolio found w.r.t. an
in-sample period is held for the following 4 weeks (out-of-sample
period of the weekly data sets) or 1 month (out-of-sample period
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of the monthly data sets).
The out-of-sample performances of the resulting portfolios are
evaluated in different ways by computing some performance mea-
sures commonly used in the literature Rachev et al (2008). Let
x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) denote the allocation of the selected portfolio
and rt = (r1t, . . . , rnt) denote the assets returns at time t. Then,
in our analysis we consider:
• the Standard Deviation of the selected portfolio return;
• the Sharpe Ratio as E[x∗r′t−rf ]Std[x∗r′t−rf ] , where rf = 0;
• the Rachev Ratio as CV aRα[rf−x∗r′t]CV aRβ [x∗r′t−rf ] , where rf = 0 and α =
β = 0.1;
• the Max Drawdown as −minx∗r′t which is the maximum
loss achieved by a portfolio during the holding period.
In our analysis we use six data sets, summarized in Table 1.1.
The monthly data sets (FF25, 48Ind, 100Ind) are taken from
Ken French’s website1. The weekly data sets (Stoxx50, FtseMib,
1http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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Data set ] of assets time interval frequency source
1 FF25 25 07/1963-12/2004 monthly K. French
2 48Ind 48 07/1963-12/2004 monthly K. French
3 100Ind 100 01/1969-12/2011 monthly K. French
4 Stoxx50 32 01/2007-05/2013 weekly Yahoo Finance
5 FtseMib 34 01/2007-05/2013 weekly Yahoo Finance
6 Ftse100 63 01/2007-05/2013 weekly Yahoo Finance
Table 1.1: List of data sets analyzed.
Ftse100) are downloaded from http://finance.yahoo.com, and are
publicly available at
http://host.uniroma3.it/docenti/cesarone/DataSets.htm.
1.3.1 In-sample analysis
For each model described in Section 2.2 we study the behavior of
its optimal value (minimum risk) when varying the number K of
assets in the portfolio.
One of our main empirical findings is the scarce effect of diver-
sification in terms of risk reduction when the portfolio size K does
not belong to a certain range of values. Indeed, in all analyzed
markets, we find that the risk measures, representing the objective
19
Figure 1.1: Boxplot of the in-sample risk w.r.t. the portfolio size for 48Ind.
20
functions of the models, achieve minimum values for a range of
portfolio sizes corresponding to a significantly limited number of
assets w.r.t. the total. Furthermore, these risk measures tend to
increase when increasing the portfolio size, thus contrasting the
paradigm that the larger the diversification, the lower the risk.
In Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 we report some empirical evidences of this
phenomenon for monthly (48Ind) and for weekly (Stoxx50) data
sets. However, this behavior is similar for each data set analyzed.
Fig. 1.1 exhibits the boxplots of the different risk measures w.r.t.
all considered in-sample windows by varying the portfolio size K.
This means that, e.g., in the case of the 48Ind data set, for a fixed
K we have 377 values of risk, one for each in-sample window (i.e.,
one for each rebalancing of the portfolio). Similarly we obtain
Fig. 1.2, where we examine the Stoxx50 data set. Note however
that in the cases of weekly data sets for a fixed K we have 32 in-
sample windows (i.e., 32 values of risk). As mentioned above, the
boxplot of the in-sample volatility generated by the EW portfolios
corresponds to that of the FSMVEW portfolios when K = n, and
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Figure 1.2: Boxplot of the in-sample risk w.r.t. the portfolio size for Stoxx50.
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it generally presents the highest median volatility. This feature
is common to all data sets, and it suggests that a greater diver-
sification does not always imply a risk reduction, i.e., increasing
the number of assets in the portfolio could worsen its in-sample
performance in terms of risk.
The empirical results of the FSMVEW portfolios could be com-
pared to the findings obtained by Evans and Archer, and by
further influential experiments in the literature such as the well-
known Fama’s experiment Fama (1976). The author finds that, in
a market with 50 stocks, the effect of naïve diversification deter-
mines a remarkable reduction of the portfolio in-sample volatility,
but only when including in the portfolio up to 20 stocks. We refer
to naïve diversification as an EW strategy with a random selection
of K out of n available stocks. Indeed, he observes that adding
further stocks in the portfolio does not yield a considerable im-
provement. More precisely, Fama claims that approximately 95%
of the possible reduction deriving from diversification is achieved
passing from 1 to 20 assets. However, we point out that our ap-
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proach is significantly different from that of Fama, as well as from
that of Evans and Archer. Indeed, we overcome one of the main
weaknesses of their approach which consists in stating results that
are valid only on average. In other words, if one picks an arbitrary
EW portfolio of a given size in a market, there is no guarantee
that its risk will not be much larger than the average risk of all
portfolios of the same size in that market. While the results ob-
tained by the FSMVEW portfolios are those corresponding to the
best Equally-Weighted portfolios for each given size with respect
to volatility. The findings on the FSMVEW model also highlight
that when the EW strategy is combined with risk minimization
(instead of a randomly selection ofK out of n available stocks) the
selected small portfolios show an improvement both in terms of
volatility and of robustness of its values obtained on all in-sample
windows.
In addition, once we have obtained the optimal size of the min-
imum risk portfolio for each in-sample window, we examine the
range spanned by these optimal sizes. In Fig. 1.3 we show for the
24
Figure 1.3: Distribution of the portfolio size corresponding to the global
minimum risk.
100Ind data set the distribution of the optimal portfolio sizes (i.e.,
corresponding to the global minimum risk) for all models analyzed
w.r.t. all in-sample windows. We can see that the global mini-
mum risk portfolio never exceeds 15 stocks for the 100Ind data set.
However, this behavior is almost the same in all the other con-
sidered data sets, with the only exception of Ftse100, where the
optimal portfolio size is seldom around 20 stocks. Furthermore,
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given the global minimum risk on an in-sample window, we de-
tect the smallest size of a portfolio whose risk is not more than 1%
larger than that of the minimum risk portfolio, thus finding even
smaller portfolios with satisfactory risk level. Then, we repeat this
procedure for each in-sample window and for each portfolio model.
In Fig. 1.4 we report the distribution of these 101% min-risk op-
timal portfolio sizes for each model analyzed w.r.t. all in-sample
windows. More precisely, for each in-sample window we consider
all the cardinalities for which the corresponding portfolio has a
risk at most 1% greater than that of the minimum risk portfolio.
As highlighted from the four sub-figures (one for each portfolio),
the 101% min-risk portfolios generally show a significant risk re-
duction with 10 stocks for 100Ind data set. Furthermore, in most
of the cases we can achieve it with just 6 stocks. However, the
101% min-risk portfolio for the other data sets never exceeds a
size of 15, and generally are needed at most 10 stocks.
The most compelling result emerging from the in-sample anal-
ysis is the existence of a portfolio size range (whose location could
26
Figure 1.4: Distribution of the 101% min-risk portfolio.
27
depend on the number of assets for each market) where one can
generally find the lowest values of risk for all models considered.
Indeed, we find that the smallest risk portfolios generally require
no more than 15 assets. Furthermore, it is almost always possible
to find portfolios that are just 1% more risky than the smallest
risk portfolios and contain no more than 10 assets.
Further evidences of this phenomenon can be found, e.g., in
Fig. 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8, where we emphasize the behavior of
the optimal range considering all the rolling time windows con-
sidered for the portfolios. More precisely, the red lines stand for
the minimum number portfolios that are, at most, 1% more risky
than the minimum risk portfolio.
1.3.2 Out-of-sample analysis
The second part of our analysis concerns the out-of-sample be-
havior of the portfolios. Our main goal is to confirm the finding,
emerged from the in-sample analysis, that we can improve perfor-
mances without investing in a large number of stocks.
Again, we consider the EW portfolio as a benchmark and, in-
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Figure 1.5: Minimum risk portfolios - 101% range (Dow Jones)
stead of focusing only on volatility reduction, we also compute the
performance indices described in Section 1.3. We start by verify-
ing the behavior of the out-of-sample standard deviation. More
precisely, we check whether this performance measure reaches an
optimal value, or at least a good value, for small-size portfolios.
We can see in Figs. 1.9a and 1.10a that, both for monthly (48Ind)
and for weekly (Stoxx50) data sets, the standard deviations of
the portfolios returns reach their minima for small sizes. For
larger sizes, the portfolios volatility tends to increase with different
growth rates. These increases, except for the FSMVEW, are due
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Figure 1.6: Minimum risk portfolios - 101% range (Euro Stoxx 50)
30
Figure 1.7: Minimum risk portfolios - 101% range (Ftse 100)
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Figure 1.8: Minimum risk portfolios - 101% range (Ftse Mib)
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(a) Volatility. (b) Rachev ratio.
Figure 1.9: Analysis of the out-of-sample portfolio returns for 48Ind.
to the buy-in threshold constraints. Without these constraints we
should expect nearly flat curves. However, the buy-in threshold
constraints are necessary to eliminate unrealistically small trades
that can otherwise be included in an optimal portfolio. In Figs.
1.9b and 1.10b we show the values of two other performance mea-
sures, namely the Rachev and Sharpe ratios for the same data
sets. As for the standard deviation, each model generally tends
to provide the best values of the latter performance measures for
small sizes. Furthermore, these values almost always decay when
the portfolio size approaches n. This behavior provides a further
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(a) Volatility. (b) Sharpe ratio.
Figure 1.10: Analysis of the out-of-sample portfolio returns for Stoxx50.
support to the idea of improving the performances of a portfolio
by limiting the number of its stocks.
In addition to the graphical evidence, where only the most
representative results are shown, we also performed an extensive
comparative analysis on all data sets considered. Since describ-
ing the results for all data sets and for all portfolio sizes is im-
practical, we report here the out-of-sample analysis for only three
fixed sizes: K = 5, 10, 15. This choice is based on the observa-
tion that K = 5, 10, 15 generally belong to the optimal ranges
in which the various models achieve the in-sample lowest risk for
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each data set. In Table 1.2 we provide the standard deviation of
the out-of-sample returns for K = 5, 10, 15 for each model and
data set analyzed. It is remarkable that the EW portfolio has
almost always the worst performance, with the single exception of
the 100Ind market, where the FSMCVaR portfolios generate the
highest standard deviation. In Table 1.3 we report the Sharpe ra-
tio of the out-of-sample returns for the same portfolio sizes of the
previous table and for each model and data set analyzed. Note
that when the portfolio excess return is negative some gain-to-risk
ratios have no meaning, thus we report “-”. Again we observe that
the EW portfolio yields the worst performances compared with
those of the other models, with the exception of the FSMCVaR
portfolios for the 100Ind and FF25 markets. Similar considera-
tions can be made about the Rachev Ratio of the out-of-sample
returns shown in Table 1.4. Indeed, again the EW portfolio tends
to be the worst choice, with the only exception of the 100Ind data
set. We also observe that for K = 10 the FSMV model seems
to be preferable since it provides the best results for 4 data sets
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K=5 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.0448 0.0378 0.0556 0.0134 0.0185 0.0169
FSMVEW 0.0431 0.0397 0.0424 0.0139 0.0181 0.0170
FSMV 0.0431 0.0377 0.0443 0.0141 0.0169 0.0166
FSMSMAD 0.0430 0.0377 0.0446 0.0136 0.0177 0.0172
EW 0.0509 0.0488 0.0512 0.0210 0.0296 0.0288
K=10 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.0447 0.0376 0.0536 0.0133 0.0189 0.0175
FSMVEW 0.0441 0.0416 0.0428 0.0125 0.0203 0.0184
FSMV 0.0432 0.0372 0.0438 0.0126 0.0170 0.0168
FSMSMAD 0.0432 0.0369 0.0440 0.0128 0.0167 0.0174
EW 0.0509 0.0488 0.0512 0.0210 0.0296 0.0288
K=15 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.0448 0.0378 0.0537 0.0134 0.0188 0.0179
FSMVEW 0.0458 0.0419 0.0435 0.0128 0.0218 0.0201
FSMV 0.0433 0.0371 0.0439 0.0127 0.0173 0.0170
FSMSMAD 0.0434 0.0367 0.0436 0.0126 0.0171 0.0175
EW 0.0509 0.0488 0.0512 0.0210 0.0296 0.0288
Table 1.2: Standard Deviation of the out-of-sample returns.
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K=5 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.244 0.279 0.133 0.334 0.124 0.211
FSMVEW 0.267 0.285 0.249 0.247 0.119 0.165
FSMV 0.268 0.293 0.249 0.257 0.126 0.207
FSMSMAD 0.276 0.293 0.247 0.244 0.086 0.198
EW 0.264 0.242 0.215 0.173 – 0.026
K=10 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.248 0.278 0.142 0.298 0.120 0.175
FSMVEW 0.290 0.268 0.256 0.284 0.091 0.099
FSMV 0.27 0.289 0.242 0.276 0.112 0.178
FSMSMAD 0.276 0.294 0.253 0.266 0.122 0.162
EW 0.264 0.242 0.215 0.173 – 0.026
K=15 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.250 0.274 0.143 0.281 0.124 0.161
FSMVEW 0.296 0.260 0.249 0.278 0.042 0.072
FSMV 0.272 0.289 0.242 0.269 0.098 0.179
FSMSMAD 0.280 0.293 0.257 0.260 0.109 0.152
EW 0.264 0.242 0.215 0.173 – 0.026
Table 1.3: Sharpe Ratio of the out-of-sample returns.
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K=5 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 1.216 1.281 0.877 1.618 1.162 1.167
FSMVEW 1.201 1.260 1.049 1.614 1.048 1.101
FSMV 1.245 1.403 1.043 1.514 1.164 1.205
FSMSMAD 1.25 1.363 1.032 1.382 1.07 1.218
EW 1.150 1.200 0.992 1.007 0.861 0.910
K=10 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 1.215 1.271 0.892 1.459 1.145 1.104
FSMVEW 1.199 1.284 1.047 1.477 0.963 1.007
FSMV 1.244 1.360 1.027 1.514 1.147 1.150
FSMSMAD 1.234 1.343 1.033 1.333 1.147 1.185
EW 1.150 1.200 0.992 1.007 0.861 0.910
K=15 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 1.217 1.245 0.896 1.397 1.123 1.064
FSMVEW 1.195 1.261 1.052 1.347 0.861 0.907
FSMV 1.244 1.343 1.024 1.426 1.135 1.135
FSMSMAD 1.234 1.343 1.047 1.320 1.103 1.132
EW 1.150 1.200 0.992 1.007 0.861 0.910
Table 1.4: Rachev Ratio of the out-of-sample returns.
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K=5 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.209 0.150 0.578 0.027 0.042 0.031
FSMVEW 0.214 0.175 0.201 0.029 0.045 0.036
FSMV 0.198 0.123 0.206 0.030 0.037 0.031
FSMSMAD 0.201 0.121 0.206 0.039 0.041 0.032
EW 0.261 0.259 0.262 0.052 0.064 0.061
K=10 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.210 0.145 0.501 0.033 0.042 0.034
FSMVEW 0.219 0.201 0.201 0.029 0.041 0.041
FSMV 0.198 0.126 0.209 0.023 0.039 0.031
FSMSMAD 0.203 0.125 0.212 0.031 0.039 0.034
EW 0.261 0.259 0.262 0.052 0.064 0.061
K=15 FF25 48Ind 100Ind Ftse100 FtseMib Stoxx50
FSMCVaR 0.212 0.141 0.493 0.029 0.040 0.036
FSMVEW 0.235 0.206 0.213 0.027 0.050 0.045
FSMV 0.199 0.129 0.210 0.027 0.039 0.031
FSMSMAD 0.203 0.127 0.210 0.027 0.040 0.035
EW 0.261 0.259 0.262 0.052 0.064 0.061
Table 1.5: Max drawdown of the out-of-sample returns.
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out of 6, while for K = 15 it presents the best performances for 5
data sets out of 6.
The last performance measure considered in our analysis is the
Max drawdown, which is the worst out-of-sample loss achieved
by a portfolio, as described in Section 1.3. Table 1.5 shows that,
again, the EW portfolio always has the worst performance for the
prescribed sizes K = 5, 10, 15, with the exception of the 100Ind
market, where the FSMCVaR portfolios provide the worst loss.
On the other hand, although there is not a clear superiority of
a single model, we observe that the FSMV portfolios present the
best values for 3 data sets out of 6 for K = 5, and for 4 data sets
out of 6 for K = 10 and for K = 15.
1.4 Conclusions
The concept of diversification is not well-defined and the measures
of diversification are continuously evolving (see, e.g., Fragkiskos
(2013); Meucci (2009) and references therein). However, the qual-
itative idea of diversification is to not overly concentrate the in-
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vestments in very few stocks. Indeed, the role of diversification is
to reduce risk by diversifying it as much as possible.
In this work we investigated the possible benefits and disadvan-
tages of enlarging the portfolio size in several portfolio selection
models with respect to various measures of performance. Similar
to various previous findings, but with a substantially different ap-
proach, our empirical results show that in most cases limiting the
size of the selected portfolio improves both the in-sample and the
out-of-sample performance. We might call this a “small portfo-
lio effect”. These results are somewhat in line with the tendency
described by DeMiguel et al (2009a), where an improved out-of-
sample performance is often observed for the 1-norm-constrained
minimum-variance portfolios. The analogy is based on the obser-
vation that the 1-norm is often regarded as an approximation of
the 0-norm, i.e., the size of the portfolio.
Further studies are underway to investigate the validity of this
small portfolio effect with respect to other risk and performance
measures and in larger markets.
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1.5 Further research
To verify the existence of a “small portfolio effect", we use the
results of Kondor and Nagy (2007), who study the estimation
error arising from a large portfolio and limited time series. The
authors claim that the noise of the minimal risk portfolio is greater
than that of the Equally Weighted portfolio. More precisely, to
measure the effect of noise on portfolio selection, the authors use
the following metrics:
q20 =
Σijw
opt
i σ
(0)
ij w
opt
j
Σijw
(0)
i σ
(0)
ij w
(0)
j
(1.6)
where the superscript opt refers to the optimal weights w and 0
to the “true" weights and the true covariance matrix elements σij.
For a portfolio with returns that are (i) standard, (ii) independent,
and (iii) normal variables, one can demonstrate that,
q0 =
1√
1− NT
, (1.7)
where N and T are the number of stocks in a market and the
length of the returns time series, respectively. In Fig. 1.11 we show
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Figure 1.11: Cumulative distribution function of risk events’ priorities
some preliminary empirical results related to the effect of noise
on portfolio selection considering a market in which the returns
follows a multivariate standard normal distribution (of dimension
N). Here, the blue line is the theoretical behavior of q0 while, for
various combination of N and T , the squares are the ratios for the
Global Minimum Variance portfolios with short selling, the circles
are the ratios of the Global Minimum Variance portfolios without
short selling, and the Xs are those of the Fixed-Size Minimum
Variance portfolios.
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As one can see from the figure, there is a huge benefit - in
terms of noise reduction - when investing in few stocks when the
ratio N/T approaches to 1. This benefit can be measured by the
vertical segment which divides the circles and the Xs from the
blue line. However, we need to verify this behavior with empirical
market data to justify a noise reduction for the portfolios with few
stocks. This last investigation is left for further research.
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Chapter 2
Operational risk assessment of a
new product using AHP
Risk assessment of a new product is one of the most critical activ-
ities performed by the Operational Risk Management (ORM) of
a company operating in the financial sector. When introducing a
new product, there are few reference points to assess its riskiness
for ORM, due both to the lack of operational loss data and to the
inexperience of the process owners in handling the new operation.
To overcome these two limitations, we propose an operational risk
framework that is able to identify and prioritize the most danger-
ous operational risk events with respect to the introduction of a
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new product in a bank. In this paper, we apply a methodology
based both on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach to
prioritize operational risk events, and on the “80/20 rule” to allo-
cate them in appropriate risk rating classes. The aim of ranking
and assigning risk rating classes is to select the mitigation actions
to protect the most exposed internal processes of a company with
respect to operational risks.
46
2.1 Introduction
A product is defined new when one or more factors such as, for in-
stance, product complexity and/or target customers, represent a
point of attention during the feasibility evaluation of the product
itself Ingber (2016). Although it is difficult to define uniquely a
new product, one can consider the cases in which a company sig-
nificantly modifies the features of an existing product (e.g. new
distribution channel, new geographic market). For instance, offer-
ing a loan to different customer segments that current ICT systems
fail to handle (as it requires a new software or an upgrade of the
existing one) is a new product. Again, one can define as new a
product that requires a modification of the risk tolerance thresh-
olds; even an existing product distributed in a geographical area
with different regulations from those of the registered office of the
company can be considered new. More generally, we can define
a product new when the current operational context of a finan-
cial institutions1 (e.g., pricing models, ICT systems, and organi-
1In any case, companies operating in other areas may also adopt this framework.
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zational models) does not allow to develop, distribute, manage,
and control it. Conversely, products that only modify contractual
terms (e.g., modification from a fixed to a floating interest rate)
are not defined as new.
According to Girling (2013), in the development phase of a new
product a company should try to identify its critical points, in-
cluding the potential operational risk exposure. For this reason, a
company should question itself “around the operational practical-
ities, accounting and tax practices, legal and regulatory require-
ments, and any other areas that should be addressed before the
launch”.
A new product can cause an exposure to both known and new
operational risk events for a bank. Such events may give rise to
several types of impacts, which are difficult to quantify in terms
of economic losses, especially because there are no historical data
of losses. “Senior management should ensure that there is an ap-
proval process for all new products, activities, processes and sys-
tems that fully assesses operational risk” Basel Committee et al
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(2011). Thus, the operational risk managers of a company must
establish a methodology to perform a risk assessment before the
launch of a new product or business.
Generally, risk assessments are based on expert judgments Cooke
(2004). Thus, it seems reasonable to use the judgements expressed
by process owners to assess the operational risks of a new prod-
uct. Since generally risk = likelihood·impact Anthony Tony Cox
(2008), classical operational risk assessments require that process
owners should identify the likelihood and the severity of the poten-
tial operational risk events2. However, this estimation can be very
difficult due to the lack of historical losses data and of experience
in managing the new operation. Furthermore, process owners’
judgments can embody cognitive biases Skjong and Wentworth
(2001). For instance, typical examples of bias are (i) the tendency
to overestimate the likelihood of the most recent events and to
underestimate that of the oldest events (availability bias); (ii) to
ignore events that rarely occurred (threshold heuristic); (iii) to
2Potential operational risk events are identified during a specific mapping activity (see
Section 2.3.1).
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maintain previous judgments (anchoring bias).
We apply a strategy to assess the operational risk of a new
product in the financial sector, which is able to overcome the
limitations of the traditional assessment methodologies, based on
the combination of the likelihood and the impact of risk events
by means of a heat map (see, e.g., Anthony Tony Cox (2008)).
Indeed, we stress that our approach does not require any informa-
tion about the frequency and the severity of the operational risk
events.
Note that there literature about the operational risk manage-
ment of a new product is scarce, even though the problem of esti-
mating the operational risk exposure of a new product is definitely
one of the main duties for operational risk managers. Further-
more, the existing bibliographical references (see, e.g., Scandizzo
(2010)) focus on what should be done instead of how to practi-
cally deal with the operational risk management of a new product.
Indeed, in previous articles and books we can find the elements
that a risk manager should consider. However, there is no trace of
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any technique or tool to implement an operational risk assessment.
Our contribution, in this context, is to provide a framework whose
tools are already widely tested in other fields (particularly in the
field of engineering). Indeed, our framework allows to assess the
riskiness of any new product. Thus, although we present a case
study related to a new financial product, one can implement our
technique in companies operating in many different fields.
More precisely, in this work we provide an operational risk
framework based on the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), by
which we are able to prioritize operational risk events (in a de-
creasing order of importance). For such a ranking, process owners
only have to perform pairwise comparisons between the elements
belonging to the same level of a decisional hierarchy Saaty (1987).
In addition, combining the results obtained from the AHP model
with the well-known “80/20 rule” (also called Pareto principle, see
Pareto (1964)), we can divide all risk events into 4 classes, each
with a specific degree of relevance.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we present
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the various phases that characterize a risk assessment process for
a new product. In Section 3 we briefly discuss the main features of
the AHP model, also describing the structure of a suitable hierar-
chy for the operational risk assessment of a new product. Section
2.3.2 shows how to apply the “80/20 rule” to cluster operational
risk events in 4 rating categories, in order to facilitate the planning
of the mitigation actions to protect the most exposed internal pro-
cesses of a company. In Section 2.3 we provide a capital budgeting
model to optimally prioritize risk mitigation actions, while in Sec-
tion 2.5 we illustrate a numerical example of the entire framework.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 2.6, where we also describe some
issues left for future research.
2.2 Risk assessment for a new product
As mentioned above, the launch of a new product makes it nec-
essary to establish a strategy to identify, evaluate and mitigate
operational risk events that can arise during or after its launch.
The European Banking Authority claims that “The Risk Control
52
function should be involved in approving new products or signifi-
cant changes to existing products. Its input should include a full
and objective assessment of risks arising from new activities under
a variety of scenarios, of any potential shortcomings in the insti-
tution’s risk management and internal control frameworks, and of
the ability of the institution to manage any new risks effectively”
European Banking Authority (2011).
According to Scandizzo (2010), an operational risk manager
should consider several risk factors related to the introduction of
a new product, such as
• new market;
• characteristics of the new product;
• new way of doing business;
• new laws;
• change in regulatory requirements;
• change in market beliefs.
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The analysis of these factors can allow to depict their causal link
with operational risk events (cause-event-effect). In other words,
risk factors can be seen as detonators for the occurrence of op-
erational risk events. Scandizzo (2010) also states that the de-
partments of a bank should highlight the operational risk aspects
of a new product, which include - inter alia - (i) potential new
reporting requirements, (ii) accounting treatment, (iii) represen-
tation within the ICT software, (iv) reinforce requirements. These
aspects should be thoroughly analyzed to detect any issues to be
solved. For example, if the system of inserting and managing data
of a product requires changes of the ICT system, then it would
be necessary to verify whether their timing is coherent with the
launch of the new product.
An operational risk manager should define a taxonomy of op-
erational risk events with a sufficient degree of detail, so that the
output of AHP can better represent the real risk profile. For in-
stance, in the case of an internal fraud event, a possible taxonomy
could be
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• level 1: internal fraud;
• level 2: unauthorised activity
• level 3: transactions not reported (intentional);
• level 4: transfer to a bank account of the same operator not
reported (intentional).
Furthermore, an operational risk manager should focus on the ex-
isting/potential internal processes to manage the operation of the
new product. Then, given the taxonomy of operational risk events
and the flowchart of the existing/potential internal processes, an
operational risk manager can perform the risk mapping into the
internal processes. Once the risk mapping is completed, process
owners can assess each potential operational risk event. As men-
tioned earlier, following the classical methodologies for operational
risk assessments, the inherent risk mainly depends on two param-
eters, namely the likelihood of loss occurrence and the expected
loss in the case of occurrence. More precisely, once process owners
have expressed their views about these two parameters, one can
estimate the inherent risk of each operational risk event by means
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of a heat map, where different levels of criticality are generally
represented by an appropriate color scale. However, during the
launch of a new product process owners have often very limited
information to carefully estimate the likelihood and the expected
loss of each operational risk event and, generally, they do not
have experience in managing the new operation. These are the
main reasons that lead us to develop a new strategy, based on
the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). As we shall explain in the
next section, following our methodology, process owners need only
pairwise comparisons between elements of the same nature, thus
significantly simplifying the evaluation phase. The main steps for
applying the AHP method to the operational risk evaluation are
listed in Section 2.3.1.
2.3 The Analytic Hierarchy Process
As discussed above, our strategy for the evaluation of a new prod-
uct is based on the Analytic Hierarch Process (AHP) technique,
which is a widely used model for multi-criteria decision analysis
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(a branch of Operations Research), introduced by Saaty (1977).
AHP aims to analyze and solve complex problems, especially those
related to the cognitive distorsion of human decisions. More gen-
erally, AHP is a method to determine a ranking among a set of
elements.
According to Forman and Selly (2001)3, AHP provides the fol-
lowing advantages:
• a decrease in the time needed to find an agreed solution4 ;
• an increase in the level of detail of the analysis;
• an increase in the level of participation and consensus of all
process owners;
• the resolution of conflicts between process owners;
• a reduction of cognitive biases during the Risk Assessment.
In our framework, AHP allows us to evaluate the relative level of
criticality for all potential operational risk events without know-
3The authors report some applications of the AHP at the Inter-American Development
Bank, among which some that concern supplier/vendor selection.
4Note that this feature is particularly useful in case of internal cross-processes involving
different owners.
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ing their likelihood of occurrence and their expected loss, histor-
ical loss data, and any experience in managing the new opera-
tion. In particular, we emphasize that AHP allows an operational
risk manager to mitigate the process owners’ cognitive bias. This
model is able to quantify, by means of a semantic scale (see Section
2.3.1 for a complete description), the process owners’ judgments
(which are the only input required by AHP), through pairwise
comparisons of the analyzed elements Saaty (2005). Furthermore,
we point out that AHP can handle multiple judgments (expressed
by different process owners) on the same couple of elements. In-
deed, AHP can aggregate these multiple judgments through a ge-
ometric mean Forman (2001). AHP is also able to quantify cog-
nitive biases by means of simple calculations (see Section 2.3.1).
2.3.1 Assessing operational risks of a new product with
AHP
Our implementation of the AHP method for the evaluation of the
operational risks related to the introduction of a new product is
similar to that of Mustafa and Al-Bahar (1991), who propose the
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assessment of the project risks for the construction of a bridge
through AHP.
Our analysis consists of the following steps:
• risk mapping;
• construction of the decisional hierarchy;
• evaluation phase.
Risk Mapping
The first step involves mapping the potential operational risk
events into the existing/potential processes of the company. To
identify all the possible events related to the new operation, one
should examine all available documentation on the new product.
From this documentation, one could derive roles and responsibili-
ties for each department of the company involved into the launch
of the new product and into the management of the new operation.
Process owners, who perform the mapping activity under the
supervision of operational risk managers, have the responsibility
of identifying all potential operational risk events.
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Construction of the decisional hierarchy
The second step of the methodology requires the representation of
a multi-criteria decision problem, which consists in prioritizing the
operational risk events due to the introduction of a new product
by means of a decisional hierarchy. A decisional hierarchy is a
multilayer structure to organize factors and actors of a problem.
Each layer is composed of homogeneous elements, namely a given
level of the hierarchy must contain a set of pairwise comparable
elements.
The decisional hierarchy of our approach consists of the follow-
ing layers:
• Layer 1: (goal) prioritize operational risk events arising from
the introduction of a new product;
• Layer 2: (decisional criteria) identify the departments of the
company involved in the management of the new operation;
• Layer 3: (sub-criteria) establish the existing/potential pro-
cesses that characterize the new operation;
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Figure 2.1: Decisional hierarchy
• Layer 4: (alternatives) identify operational risk events in each
process.
To support intuition, In Fig. 2.1 we provide a scheme of the
decisional hierarchy. Note that the modularity of this hierarchy
could also allow us to add a further layer. For instance, this fifth
layer could contain the loss effects due to an operational risk event,
or the risk factors that can determine a given loss event.
The elements of a layer of the hierarchy can be clustered into
groups. Each group is a set of homogeneous elements that a pro-
cess owner must pairwise compare and that are connected to the
same element of the upper layer of the hierarchy. For example,
in Fig.2.1 the set of risks (Risk “1”, Risk “2”, ..., Risk “k”) related
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to Process “1” is a group. Niemira and Saaty (2004) suggest to
create groups with few elements to simplify the decision making
process.
The output provided by AHP is a scalar (called a priority) for
each operational risk event, which enables to rank the risk events
with respect to their level of criticality. As shown more in detail
in next section, one can compare these priorities locally, namely
among elements of a cluster (so-called “Local Scale”), or globally,
namely among elements of a layer (so-called “Global Scale”). Note
that all the elements of Layer 2 are considered as a single group.
Thus, in Layer 2 the Global and the Local Scale comparisons
coincide.
Evaluation phase
The last step of the analysis consists in assessing the relative im-
portance of the elements belonging to the same layer by means of
process owners’ judgments. More in detail, this phase is generally
performed by the operational risk managers, who can use several
ways to collect this information, e.g., through a survey, a work-
62
shop, or interviews. We believe that the most convenient way to
gather information is an interview with process owners, so that
an operational risk manager can directly control their cognitive
biases. Indeed, operational risk managers can report in real-time
to a process owner any inconsistencies of his judgments by means
of the Consistency Ratio, which quantifies cognitive biases (see
Expression (2.1)).
One of the key properties of AHP is to reduce possible cog-
nitive biases by simplifying the decision-making process, namely
by pairwise comparing elements rather than comparing them all
together.
In practice, for pairwise comparisons required by AHP, opera-
tional risk managers could ask process owners, during the inter-
views, questions of this kind5: “with reference to the operational
risk level of the new product, what is the department that manages
the most risky processes between Department “1” and Department
5Probably, the most suitable person to assess the riskiness of each organizational unit
is the project manager who is responsible for monitoring the launch of the new product.
Note that the project manager is, in turn, a process owner.
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Intensity of
importance on an Definition Explanation
absolute scale
1 Equal importance Two activities contribute equally to the objective
3 Moderate importance of Experience and judgment slightly favour
one over another one activity over another
5 Essential or strong importance Experience and judgment strongly favour
of one over another one activity over another
7 Very strong importance of An activity is favoured very strongly over another;
one over another its dominance demonstrated in practice
9 Extreme importance of The evidence favouring one activity over another
one over another is of the highest possible order of affirmation
2, 4, 6, 8 Intermediate values between When compromise is needed
the two adjacent judgments
Table 2.1: Semantic scale
“2”? To what extent? ”. Process owners could answer these ques-
tions through the semantic scale proposed by Saaty (1988) and
reported in Table 2.1. Clearly, the purpose of this scale, whose
values range from 1 to 9, is to convert qualitative judgments into
ordinal numbers6. A justification for the interval [1, 9] of the se-
mantic scale is due to Dehaene (2011), who states that “intro-
spection suggests that we can mentally represent the meaning of
6According to Dantzig (1954), “number sense should not be confused with counting,
which is probably of a much later vintage, and involves, as we shall see, a rather intricate
mental process”. Indeed, through number sense it is possible to compare a plurality of
objects.
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Element1 Element2 . . . ElementN
Element1 1 a12 · · · a1N
Element2 1/a12 1 · · · a2N
...
... · · · ... ...
ElementN 1/a1N 1/a2N · · · 1
Table 2.2: Generic pairwise comparison matrix
numbers 1 through 9 with actual acuity. Indeed, these symbols
seem equivalent to us”.
The judgements on elements of a given cluster are collected
within a so-called pairwise comparison matrix (see Table 2.2).
For a practical construction of the pairwise comparison matrix,
see the case study described in Section 2.5. However, for sake of
clarity, we can say that if a process owner assigns the value of 3
(i.e., moderate importance of one over another) when comparing
elements “1” and “2” of the same group, then a12 = 3. In addition,
in order for the comparison between the elements “1” and “2” to
be consistent, we have that a21 = 1a12 =
1
3 . Summarizing, the
pairwise comparison matrices have the following properties:
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1. by construction, the elements of the diagonal are all equal to
one (i.e., each element is equally important to itself);
2. for consistency the elements of the upper triangle are recip-
rocal with respect to those of the lower triangle.
Note that, thanks to these properties, a process owner must only
express N(N − 1)/2 comparisons to fulfil a pairwise comparison
matrix. With this matrix it is possible to compute the priori-
ties of the elements belonging to the same cluster. A strategy
to obtain the priorities of the elements from their pairwise com-
parison matrix is the principal eigenvalue method Saaty (2003),
where the priorities are given by the components of the normalized
eigenvector ωmax corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue λmax.
One of the advantages of the principal eigenvector method is its
capability of easily quantifying the process owner’s bias through
the so-called Consistency Ratio (CR). This ratio is calculated as
follows:
CR =
CI
RI
(2.1)
where CI and RI are the Consistency Index and the Random In-
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N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RI 0 0 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49
Table 2.3: Random Index values
dex, respectively. The Consistency Index is
CI =
λmax −N
N − 1 (2.2)
The Random Index is a parameter that depends on the number
of elements of the pairwise comparison matrix, as reported in Ta-
ble 2.3 (see Saaty (2003)). According to Saaty (1990) a pairwise
comparison matrix is consistent when CR ≤ 10%. Consistency is
closely linked to the following requirements: (a) aij = 1aji and (b)
aijajk = aik for all i, j, k = 1, ..., n. As described above, the prior-
ities of a cluster of potential operational risk events, calculated by
the principal normalized eigenvector ωmax, represent the relative
importance of each risk event with respect to the others belonging
to the same cluster (the so-called “Local Scale”). Once we have
calculated the priorities for all clusters of two contiguous layers
in the hierarchy (see Fig.2.1), we can compute the “Global Scale”
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priority of each element of the lower layer with a multiplicative
approach, as described from the following example. Let us assume
that Layer 2 consists of 2 elements, Department “1” and Depart-
ment “2”, having local scale priorities ω1 = 70% and ω2 = 30%,
and that Layer 3 provides two clusters: c1 linked to Department
“1” and containing three elements (γ, δ, and ε); and c2 linked
to Department “2” and containing two elements (φ, η). The lo-
cal scale priorities of the three elements of c1 are ωLSγ = 50%,
ωLSδ = 20%, ω
LS
ε = 30%, while those of the remaining two are
ωLSφ = 50%, ω
LS
η = 50%. Then, the global scale priorities of the
elements belonging to Layer 3 are ωGSγ = 70% × 50% = 35% ,
ωGSδ = 14% , ω
GS
ε = 21%, ωGSφ = 15%, and ω
GS
η = 15%. The
same mechanism is true for the remaining layer of the hierarchy.
The global scale priorities of the risk events (i.e., the elements
of Layer 4 of the hierarchy) represent the relative contribution of
each potential operational risk event to the overall risk profile of
the new product. Thus, through the Global Scale priorities, one
can prioritize operational risk events in terms of relevance (in a
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decreasing order).
2.3.2 80/20 rule
Once the ranking of the potential operational risk events is ob-
tained from the AHP method, we can group this set into four
rating clusters to better represent their criticality when choos-
ing the risks to be mitigated. For this purpose, we use Juran’s
“80/20 rule”7, which is a widespread empirical principle (used in
several business fields) that states that roughly 80% of a phe-
nomenon is explained by roughly 20% (“vital few”) of its causes
Juran (1951). This 80/20 rule could facilitate risk managers to
interpret the output provided by AHP. In view of this rule, we
cluster the operational risk events, identified by the process own-
ers, into four rating categories in a decreasing order of relevance:
“critical”, “high”, “medium”, “low”.
To determine the four classes of rating, we first identify three
classes by the cost-benefit analysis of Lysons and Farrington (2006),
and then we split the first class into two sets, as shown in Table
7Juran was inspired by Pareto’s results (Pareto, 1896).
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ABC ANALYSIS Lysons and Farrington (2006) Risk rating classes
Elements cumulative Relative contribution to
Class of Elements Relevance Rating distribution range overall risk of
elements the new product
Class A First 20% ' 80% Critical [0%, 5%] ' 50%
High (5%,20%] ' 30%
Class B Second 30% ' 15% Medium (20%, 50%] ' 15%
Class C Remaining 50% ' 5% Low (50%, 100%] ' 5%
Table 2.4: Risk rating classes for the operational risk events of a new product.
2.4. In a nutshell, these four classes are obtained by fixing ap-
propriate cut-offs on the cumulative distribution function of the
operational risk events.
In our framework, we can interpret the “80/20” rule by stating
that roughly the 80% of the operational risk related to the intro-
duction of a new product is due to roughly 20% of the risk events
identified by the process owners. To establish the above mentioned
cut-offs, we refer to the quantiles of the cumulative distribution
function of the operational risk events (sorted in descending or-
der) with respect to their ranking obtained by the AHP model.
This means that our “vital few” elements are both the “critical”
and the “high” risks.
Note that, using this additional clustering into four classes,
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the Management of a company can choose to focus on mitigation
actions especially for “critical” and “high” risks, coherently with
principles of parsimony and efficiency. However, this choice has to
be coherent with the risk appetite and the risk tolerance thresh-
olds defined by the same Management. Conversely, “medium” and
“low” risks, as a matter of principle, should be constantly moni-
tored in order to ensure that these risks remain below appropriate
tolerance thresholds established by the Management. Indeed, in
the case of risk events related to strategic processes, the Manage-
ment can choose to invest in additional mitigation actions also for
“medium” and “low” risks.
Although the primary goal is to guarantee the core processes, it
is reasonable to assume that the Management of a company wants
to try to maximize efficiency for a given money budget and other
available resources. In this context, grouping these two categories
of risks (“medium” and “low”) is fundamental to save money and
other resources.
A further support to these evidences can be obtained from Fig.
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2.2, where we report a theoretical cumulative distribution of the
priorities of the risk events. Indeed, one can directly observe the
importance of the contribution to risk with respect to the number
of operational risks. Note that the closer the cdf of the operational
risk events to the Pareto distribution is, the more the use of the
“80/20 rule” is justified.
Furthermore, we point out that the risk map should provide at
least 20 operational risk events to apply the “80/20 rule”. Indeed,
if the number of risk events is less than 20, then the first 5% of
elements is less than a single risk event.
2.4 Optimally choosing the mitigation actions
of the intervention plan
Once the most relevant risk events are identified by means of the
AHP model and of the 80/20 Rule, process owners must sketch
proper mitigation actions, which generally concern the develop-
ment of existing/new ICT systems, staffing review, drawing of in-
ternal processes, and policy formalization. Note that a mitigation
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative distribution function of risk events’ priorities
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action can cover one or more risk events, while each risk event can
be covered by one or more mitigation actions. A company should
first estimate the cost of each mitigation action. Then one can
search for an optimal intervention plan to reduce the operational
risk exposure arising from a new product.
A typical aim in operational risk management is to cover the
operational risk exposure minimizing the cost of the mitigation
actions. Thus, considering n risk events (i.e. those critical and
high) andmmitigation actions, we solve the following set covering
problem:
min cTx
s.t. Ax ≥ 1
x ∈ {0, 1}m
(2.3)
where 1 is the all-ones vector of dimension m, c is the vector
of costs of the mitigation actions, and A is a n × m boolean
matrix with rows representing the risk events and the columns
representing the mitigation actions. Element aij is 1 if the action
i mitigates risk event j, and 0 otherwise.
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The output of the model (for a practical application, see Sec.
2.5) provides the mitigation actions that secure the internal pro-
cesses of the company, minimizing the cost of the intervention
plan. One of the most interesting features of the model is that
one can handle overlaps among mitigation actions by minimizing
their total cost.
2.4.1 Optimally choosing a subset of mitigation actions
As previous mentioned, operational risk managers together with
process owners must rank the potential risk events. Furthermore,
critical and high risk events should be all mitigated by means of
suitable corrective actions. However, the Management of a com-
pany can adjust the aforementioned ranking, in coherence with its
risk tolerance. Accordingly to this faculty, the Management can
choose to mitigate only a subset of these events or rather extend
the set of the risks upon which it is necessary to identify an inter-
vention. In other words, they can either judge that the company
has bigger fishes to fry or that a medium/low risk events could
put the company on thin ice.
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The company is safe and sound only when mitigating all the
most relevant risks (better safe than sorry!). However, the budget
might not suffice to cover all critical and high risks. In this con-
text, the Management should choose a subset of mitigation actions
to get the best sub-optimal situation, aiming at not throwing the
baby out with the bathwater. An operational risk manager could
help the Management providing a model to achieve the highest
reduction in operational risk exposure under a budget constraint.
Note that, if one looks more closely, we have already established
a rule to prioritize risk events (i.e. the Analytic Hierarchy Pro-
cess) and to identify the subset of risk events to mitigate (i.e. the
80/20 rule): now we deal with an additional problem related to
the unavailability of an appropriate budget.
The following optimization problem represents a possible solu-
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tion to choose the best subset of mitigation actions:
max pT y
s.t. cx ≤ b
y ≤ Ax ≤ my
y ∈ {0, 1}n
x ∈ {0, 1}m
(2.4)
where m and n are the number of mitigation actions and risk
events, respectively. Furthermore, p is the reduction of operational
risk exposure correlated to each mitigant8 and b is the available
budget. Here xi = 1 if the i-th mitigation action is chosen, and
xi = 0 otherwise. On the other hand, note that the constraint
y ≤ Ax ≤ my implies that yj = 1 if at least one mitigation action
covers the j-th risk event, and yj = 0 otherwise. Thus, the model
correctly aims at maximizing the score of all mitigated risks.
However, as previously mentioned, one should take the output
of this model with a grain of salt. Indeed, the model provides
8We assume here that the reduction of operational risk exposure of a given mitigation
action, is equal to the sum of the priorities (obtained with the Analytic Hierarchy Process)
of the risk events that the action covers.
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the optimal combination of mitigation actions in terms of prior-
ity, without caring about to the processes they secure. However,
in a more refined version of the model, one can also include con-
straints on the minimum reduction for each process (considering
the location of the risk events).
One of the most interesting feature of Model 2.4 is the possibil-
ity of performing a parametric analysis for different budgets. More
precisely, one can obtain the optimal sets of mitigation actions ob-
tained by increasing the available financial resources b. This can
be used by the Management to decide whether an increase in the
budget to mitigate operational risk exposure is justified by an
increase in the score of the risks covered.
2.5 Case study
Imagine a bank wants to launch a new type of loan. The goal
of the problem is to prioritize the most relevant operational risk
events arising from the new product. The three departments (i.e.
criteria) taken into account are (i) Front Office, (ii) Back Office,
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(i) (ii) (iii)
(i)FrontOffice 1 3 5
(ii)BackOffice 1/3 1 3
(iii)MiddleOffice 1/5 1/3 1
Table 2.5: Departments pairwise comparison matrix
and (iii) Middle Office. Given the following pairwise comparison
matrix
one can easily calculate the normalized maximum eigenvector ωDepmax =
(0.64 0.26 0.10).
The processes (i.e., sub-criteria) are: (a) Inquiry; (b) Delibera-
tion; (c) Disbursement; (d) Recovery; (e) Monitoring; (f) Renewal.
The alternatives are the possible breakdowns that can arise dur-
ing the operations, identified by the process owners, which are the
operational risk events. In this case study they are:
#1 Missed verification of prejudice absence and of previous/ pendants competition pro-
ceedings
#2 Data entry errors regarding customers/guarantees/other data for the evaluation of
the credit worthiness
#3 Missing/ incomplete/ not updated documentation, related to third parties and re-
quired for the inquiry by internal procedures
#4 Missed analysis of the links between subject to inquiry and its legal/ economic mem-
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bership group
#5 Deliberation of a loan beyond delegated powers
#6 Unavailability of ICT systems that support the deliberation of a loan
#7 Documentation for the execution of the contract falsifified by internal resources
#8 Missing/ incomplete/ not updated contracts
#9 Disavowed signature and/or signature of people without proper power
#10 Failure to notify credit transfer
#11 Hacking of ICT systems that support the delivery of a loan
#12 Delay or failure to activate credit recovery actions (unintentional)
#13 Failure to observe the terms for insinuations for concourse procedures
#14 Failure to activate credit recovery actions (intentional)
#15 Lack of preservation of physical goods given as collateral
#16 Failure to control or reintegrate value of collateral over time
#17 Errors in the preparation of the report on the status of mortgages granted and
disbursed
#18 Unavailability of ICT systems that support the renewal of a loan
#19 Data entry errors regarding customers/guarantees/other data for the evaluation of
the credit worthiness
#20 Errors in archiving customer documentation for the renewal of a loan (intentional)
Given the above cited elements for the problem, one can build
the decisional hierarchy of Fig. 2.3 To complete the hierarchy,
on one hand, process owners must evaluate the processes with
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Figure 2.3: Decisional hierarchy
respect to their reference department and, on the other hand, the
risk events with respect to their reference process. In both cases,
process owners must follow the steps below
1. fulfil the pairwise comparison matrices;
2. check the consistency of judgments by means of the Consis-
tency Ratio;
3. calculate the normalized eigenvector corresponding to the
maximum eigenvalue;
4. convert the global scale priorities into the local scale.
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(i) (ii)
(i)Inquiry 1 1/7
(ii)Deliberation 7 1
Table 2.6: Processes protected by the Front Office
(i) (ii)
(i)Disbursement 1 5
(ii)Recovery 1/5 1
Table 2.7: Processes protected by the Middle Office
Here we list the remaining pairwise comparison matrices needed
to solve the problem. First, we compare the processes related to
their reference departments:
Second, we list the pairwise comparison matrices of the risks
potentially arising from the processes.
We report the local scale priorities of the elements considered
in the analysis (for simplicity, we do not include all the pairwise
comparison matrices) in Fig. 2.4: Applying the 80/20 rule we find
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(i) (ii)
(i)Monitoring 1 9
(ii)Renewal 1/9 1
Table 2.8: Processes protected by the Back Office
#1 #2 #3 #4
#1 1 1 3 1
#2 1 1 3 1/3
#3 1/3 1/3 1 1/3
#4 1 3 3 1
Table 2.9: Risks of the inquiry
#5 #6 #7
#5 1 1/5 1/7
#6 5 1 1/3
#7 7 3 1
Table 2.10: Risks of the inquiry
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#8 #9 #10 #11
#8 1 3 1 1/9
#9 1/3 1 1 1/7
#10 1 1 1 1/9
#11 9 7 9 1
Table 2.11: Risks of the disbursement
#12 #13 #14
#12 1 1 1/5
#13 1 1 1/5
#14 5 5 1
Table 2.12: Risks of the recovery
#15 #16 #17
#15 1 1/7 1/5
#16 7 1 3
#17 5 1/3 1
Table 2.13: Risks of the monitoring
84
#18 #19 #20
#18 1 1 3
#19 1 1 3
#20 1/3 1/3 1
Table 2.14: Risks of the renewal
Figure 2.4: Local scale priorities of the elements
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a unique “critical” risk (i.e. #7 Documentation for the execution of
the contract falsifified by internal resources) and four “high” risks
(i.e. #11, #6, #16, and #5). To mitigate these five risk events,
process owners hypothesize the following mitigation actions (into
the square brackets we show their cost):
A Drawing a new process for handling the operation [50];
B Recruitment of 4 junior analysts [60];
C Recruitment of 2 senior analysts [100];
D Purchasing an external software to support the operation [120];
E Development of an internal tool to support the operation [180].
Into the boolean matrix 2.15 we show what risks are covered by
each mitigation action (1 if the risk is covered, 0 otherwise) Solving
the model of Sec. 2.4 one can optimize the cost of mitigation
actions necessary to secure the most critical processes. In this
case study, the optimal choice is the implementation of mitigation
actions “A” and “D”. Indeed, thanks to these two actions, one can
mitigate all the “critical” and “high” risk events.
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A B C D E
#7 1 0 1 0 0
#11 0 0 0 1 1
#6 0 0 0 1 1
#16 1 1 1 0 1
#5 0 1 1 1 1
Table 2.15: Mitigation actions vs risk events
2.6 Conclusions
Our approach to assess the operational risk exposure arising from
the launch of a new product provides several advantages. First,
AHP allows to address the lack of information through a sim-
plification of the decision-making process. Furthermore, we can
control the process owner’s cognitive bias. We are still able to
estimate a rating for each operational risk event, thus making the
output of the AHP more intuitive. Indeed, the main goal of the
proposed methodology is to identify the most exposed internal
process of a company and, consequently, to reduce the gaps of
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the control environment. In this context, the application of the
“80/20 rule” helps to narrow down the environment of the most
urgent mitigation actions.
The impossibility to implement appropriate mitigation actions,
against the most significant operational risk events, can cause sev-
eral impacts of different types, including material operating losses.
These impacts can affect the success of the new product implemen-
tation project and, in extreme cases, can compromise the business
continuity.
Thanks to the approach shown in this paper, the operational
risk managers of a company operating in the financial sectors can
carry out an operational risk assessment for the new product.
This analysis falls into the broader perimeter of the new product
approval process which involves the entire risk management de-
partment and should provide a useful tool to express an informed
opinion on its feasibility.
Further studies are underway to investigate the possibility of
improving the flexibility of the two optimization models shown
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above to be able to consider also partial mitigation actions (e.g.,
if a given mitigation action involves hiring 4 people, we want to
investigate what can be the effect of hiring only 2 of them).
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